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Microfinance is a concept that has greatly expanded in meaning and practice since its inception. As a result of its diversification, there are a variety of ways to differ-
entiate between microfinance institutions (MFIs). One possible 
method, to which this paper subscribes, is to distinguish MFIs 
based on their particular approach to service delivery in terms of 
either products and services they choose to offer to clients; why 
they make this choice; or how they administer those services. One 
group of MFIs chooses to provide only financial products to their 
clients, primarily in the form of small loans, in order to maximize 
operational efficiency. #is strategy contrasts with MFIs that 
choose to consider additional means of economic and social devel-
opment within their purview. #ese MFIs offer additional services 
beyond standard credit products, such as life insurance products, 
educational programs, and direct healthcare. For the purposes of 
this study I term this the “integrated” approach to microfinance. 
 #is study takes as its basis the premise that achieving a 
balance between the financial sustainability and the social impact 
of an organization is one of the most significant goals of microfi-
nance.1 Based on this assumption, the primary research question of 
this study is: what approach to service delivery is most effective in 
helping an MFI achieve a balance between financial well-being and 
social impact? Financial well-being is a broad category; thus this 
paper focuses on financial sustainability, defined as an organiza-
tion’s ability to reach its target population while covering adminis-
trative and other costs.*2 In seeking to answer this question, I
* In context of microfinance, Financial Sustainability is essentially the same as Operational Self-
Sufficiency (OSS). OSS=total operating revenues/total administrative and financial expenses. If 
the resulting figure is greater than one hundred, the organization under evaluation is considered 
to be operationally self-sufficient. Operationally sustainable microfinance institutions are able to 
cover administrative costs with client revenues.
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 conducted research for two months in Peru and Bolivia, surveyed a 
wide variety of integrated and non-integrated MFIs, and collected 
qualitative data from field observations and interviews with micro-
finance stakeholders. I sought their perspective on their organiza-
tion’s specific approach to service delivery as well as their views on 
the tradeoff between solvency and social mission. 
Research focused on the various approaches to service deliv-
ery in the microfinance sectors of Peru and Bolivia, both of which 
are well-developed and rapidly growing, and whose MFIs serve as 
models worldwide. As of 2009, MixMarket reported that Peru had 
sixty-five total MFIs, a gross loan portfolio of 5.5 billion dollars, 
and 3.1 million active borrowers. In 2005, the microfinance sector 
in Peru represented only 5 percent of the total financial sector, but 
the country’s MFIs had as much as 40 percent of the total number 
of borrowers in the financial system.3 As of 2009, MixMarket re-
ported that Bolivia had twenty-six total MFIs, a gross loan portfo-
lio of 1.9 billion dollars, and 872,655 active borrowers. "ese two 
countries were selected because they are neighbors, microfinance 
exemplars, and contain a wide mix of purely financial MFIs and 
service integrated MFIs. 
Current literature has called into question the previously 
touted effectiveness of microfinance and many in the microfinance 
community acknowledge the difficulty of fighting poverty through 
micro-loans alone.4 A new approach is now necessary in order to 
“put development back into microfinance.”* Based on contempora-
neous literature and on the perspectives of MFI leaders and em-
ployees, I conclude that the integrated service approach provides 
the best framework through which to balance the demands be-
tween financial sustainability and social impact. Opinion on the 
manner, however, is still mixed: while many practitioners and ex-
perts hold that no inherent conflict exists between these two aims, 
others believe a tradeoff inevitable. 
It must be acknowledged that there is no one correct way to 
practice microfinance and that bundling a variety of services into 
MFIs is not always the most effective approach. "e appropriate 
* "e subtitle of Fisher and Sriram’s 2002 book is “Putting development back into microfinance.”
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context is required to make integration effective, and it is certainly 
possible to practice integrated microfinance in a way that has little 
added effect on clients and MFI operations. However, contrary to 
common criticisms of the service integration approach, my data 
demonstrate that providing additional non-financial services to 
clients does not necessarily lead to insolvency. In fact, my primary 
data reveal cases in which service integration not only failed to di-
minish sustainability and organizational well-being, but actually 
lead to improvements in these areas. 
BACKGROUND
 Many entities that are today microfinance NGOs began 
with a stricter focus in development and gradually moved into the 
microfinance sector for various reasons. Pro Mujer—an MFI active 
in five countries in Latin America, among them Peru and Boliv-
ia—began providing financial services to its clients not because the 
organization was losing clients, but rather because those it served 
wanted additional financial services in order to further their prog-
ress. Carmen Velasco explained that when she and her co-founder 
began the organization, they provided only basic business training 
to Bolivian women. "e women enjoyed the training and were ea-
ger to make business plans, but the directors realized that without 
funding, their clients could not ‘take the next step’ regarding their 
business initiatives. Upon the receipt of a U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) donation, Pro Mujer’s directors 
were able to launch the credit component of the organization’s op-
erations. 
As a percentage of the global network of MFIs, which as of 
2007 served approximately 155 million clients,* there are still only 
a small number of MFIs that have pioneered the integrated ap-
proach and established successful models. While experts and prac-
titioners do not yet fully understand the financial impact of service 
integration, they generally accepted that going beyond basic credit 
and savings products adds cost. Because of the willingness to in-
* "is number comes from the Microcredit Summit Campaign.
231Journal of Politics & Society
cur this extra cost, the majority of MFIs attempting the integrated 
approach are not-for-profit. Non-profit MFIs often have a more 
explicit social mandate than their for-profit counterparts, and the 
integration of services supports the achievement of the organiza-
tions’ mission (and is sometimes even central to it). Another com-
mon characteristic is the use of some form of the village-banking 
model in which clients meet in groups on a regular schedule, as 
group settings allow for the more efficient delivery of social services 
like educational sessions.5 
"e two major approaches to service integration are the par-
allel approach and the unified approach.6 In the parallel system, 
MFIs forge partnerships with external service providers that de-
liver social services to their clients. In the unified approach staff 
members within the MFI provide these services. One way in which 
unified MFIs sustain the cost of their non-financial services is the 
cross-subsidization of non revenue-earning activities with margins 
earned from financial services. For example, an MFI can use the 
revenue it earns from interest charged on loans to pay for an educa-
tion component. "is approach can help organizations offset the 
costs of non-financial services. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
A growing number of studies have attempted to quantify the 
effects of microfinance on clients’ lives. In 2005, the MIT Poverty 
Action Lab undertook a randomized evaluation of the impacts of 
introducing microcredit in a new market. "e researchers opened 
MFI branches in half of the slums in one Indian region, while the 
other half did not receive the intervention. "ey used only the stan-
dard group loan (first used by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh), 
in which a group of ten women received a loan and were all jointly 
responsible for its repayment. "e results revealed that the intro-
duction of microcredit has some varied and significant effects on 
business outcomes and the composition of household expenditure. 
While the study showed that microcredit could enable households 
to borrow and invest, it revealed no short-term (fifteen to eighteen 
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months) impact on social measures such as health, education, or 
women’s decision-making.7 
A small body of literature has also looked into whether mi-
crofinance can be an effective tool to reach the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) and, if so, in what way. In a 2003 paper, re-
searchers from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) 
argued that microfinance plays an important role in meeting the 
MDGs in the following areas: eradicating poverty, promoting 
children’s education, improving health outcomes for women and 
children, and empowering women.8 "e authors give the rationale 
that many other interventions such as employment, education, and 
healthcare depend on people’s access to financial services, and that 
improvements in these other areas can only be maintained when 
households have increased control over financial resources.
While research focusing specifically on the effects of inte-
grated microfinance is relatively rare, the work done has largely 
confirmed the positive nature of its impact. 9 Institutions like 
Freedom from Hunger (FFH) and Innovations for Poverty Action 
(IPA) have performed several useful studies. Led by Dean Karlan 
and Martin Valdivia, these two organizations conducted an impact 
study in 2006, in which a randomized control design was used to 
examine the MFI Finca-Peru. Clients receiving only credit servic-
es were compared with those who received financial services and 
FFH’s business education program on topics like business strategy 
and marketing. "e results indicated that recipients of both cred-
it and education services displayed greater business acumen and 
higher revenues than those who received only credit services. From 
the perspective of the MFI’s financial health, the results showed 
higher repayment and retention rates among education clients; this 
is supposedly because the clients had improved their businesses 
and were able to repay more reliably, as well as because the clients 
valued the training they received and thus felt loyal to the institu-
tion. "e higher retention rate translated into increased revenue 
for the MFI. It was calculated, however, that adding this education 
to the program had a marginal cost of 6 to 9 percent, Critics of 
the integrated model or those who look to minimize costs might 
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argue that this marginal cost is imprudent.10 But proponents of 
integration would argue that this increased cost is not significant 
enough to justify turning down this approach, especially because 
the increased revenue due to heightened rates of repayment and 
client retention exceeded the 6 to 9 percent cost.11 
One of the primary factors deterring MFIs from taking this 
approach is the trend toward commercialization and profit-seeking 
activities within the microfinance community. In a 2010 paper, 
“Weaving straw into gold,” Rodrigo Canales writes, 
As NGOs, MFIs initially could rely only on donors –and re-
tained earnings if available—to fund their growth (Marulanda 
and Otero 2005). !is generated a dual pressure—from their 
need to fund their own growth and their dependence on  
donors—to adhere to strict norms of efficiency and profitability 
with a narrower  focus on microcredit, the most profitable of 
their services (Dugan and Goodwin-Groen 2005).12
As microloans are the most profitable product that MFIs offer, 
some organizations are being pressured into taking a narrow ap-
proach and leaving out non-credit products. !ere are also addi-
tional pressures for MFIs to “install complex accounting and mana-
gerial systems.”  !is explains why integrated microfinance, which 
has a more complex accounting system due to difficult-to-quantify 
costs, would be difficult to justify in the new, conservatively minded 
financial environment.13 !e increase in international ratings or-
ganizations that specifically track MFIs, such as MicroRate, Planet 
Rating, and Micro Finanza Rating, in turn increases the pressure 
on MFIs to be profitable, attract investors, and “conform to interna-
tional standards and best practices.” !ese pressures squeeze cur-
rent practitioners of the integrated approach and discourage new 
MFIs from adopting service integration because of the difficulty 
of standardizing non-credit services such as education and health-
care initiatives. Yet, as I will discuss later, my interviews also indi-
cate that a strong social mandate and well-defined organizational 
policies could allow MFIs to continue to pursue their stated goals 
rather than face  “mission drift,” i.e., the gradual abandonment of 
the poverty-reduction aims of the microfinance sector. 
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 Julia Battilana and Silvia Dorado recently examined the 
history of this growing pressure in a recent paper, “Building sus-
tainable hybrid organizations.”14 !ey write:
!ese new organizations combined two previously separate 
logics: a development logic that guided their mission to help the 
poor, and a banking logic that required profits sufficient to sup-
port ongoing operations and fulfill fiduciary obligations… !e 
pioneering commercial microfinance organizations thus faced 
the double challenge of having to survive as new ventures while 
striking a delicate balance between the banking and develop-
ment logics they combined, and avoiding mission drift.
I argue that this sought-after equilibrium between the bank-
ing and development aspects of MFIs can be translated into a more 
general balance between financial sustainability and social impact 
in the microfinance sector. While agreement among those inter-
viewed was not unanimous, I believe that this balance is possible 
and the tradeoff is not inevitable. 
PROJECT METHODOLOGY
!e original aim of my project was to obtain a general pic-
ture of the microfinance landscapes in the neighboring countries 
of Peru and Bolivia and to discover how their approaches to service 
delivery compare. I intended to collect management perspectives 
on the qualitative relationship between financial sustainability and 
social impact, based on whether an MFI was offering purely finan-
cial services or a mix of financial and non-financial services. Final-
ly, I hoped to synthesize all of the data collected and determine 
whether one particular microfinance service model, organizational 
experience, or theoretical approach to microfinance stood out as 
particularly noteworthy.
To conduct the field research for this project, I traveled in Peru 
and Bolivia for two-and-a-half months in the summer of 2009. !e 
project’s scope required a sample size that was limited in relation to 
the entire market. To ensure a general amount of representation of 
the two sectors and a variety of service delivery approaches, I chose 
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geographic locations and specific MFIs using purposive sampling.* 
I selected a mix of for-profit MFIs that are regulated by banking 
authorities,† as well as unregulated, non-profit MFIs with non-
governmental organization (NGO) status.‡
In order to analyze the various MFIs in my study, I used snow-
ball and convenience sampling§. In total, I visited thirteen MFIs¶ 
and conducted interviews with thirty-one different MFI manag-
ers and employees, three professionals working in institutions that 
provide external support and funding to MFIs, three academics 
studying microfinance, one microfinance rating agency employee, 
and three MFI clients. I interviewed MFI employees who held a 
variety of positions, from executive director to director of product 
development for thirty to ninety minutes. I chose to include a wide 
variety of microfinance topics rather than focusing the conversa-
tion solely on my primary research questions and potentially bias-
ing the interviewee in a particular direction. I also visited several 
MFI client centers, conducted participant observation of loan re-
payment meetings and group education modules, and accompanied 
loan officers on their daily routines of visiting the homes and/or 
* Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling technique in which subjects are selected for 
a study because of some characteristic they possess. 
† #e for-profit category includes non-bank financial institutions (NBFI), commercial banks 
that specialize in microfinance, and microfinance departments of full-service banks. (MicroRate)
‡ In addition to NGOs, the non-profit category also includes credit unions and other financial 
cooperatives, and state-owned development and postal savings banks. It should be noted that 
this project gives NGOs a disproportionate amount of attention in relation to their actual role in 
the entire sector. #is decision was a result of my prior knowledge that NGOs were the primary 
entities conducting integrated microfinance (as integration was an important innovation to 
consider as an approach to service delivery). 
§ Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling technique in which existing subjects of a 
study recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances. It is akin to networking, and it 
was an appropriate form of sampling in my study because members of the Latin American 
microfinance community are very familiar with one another. Convenience sampling means that 
research subjects are in part selected at the convenience of the researcher, which was necessary 
for my study because I did not have access to every leader in the microfinance field. 
¶ Lima, Peru MFIs included in my study: the NGO Finca-Peru, the NGO ADRA Peru, 
the NGO Prisma, and the for-profit EDPYME Credivision. La Paz, Bolivia MFIs included 
in my study: the bank BancoSol, the bank Fie, the NGO Pro Mujer Bolivia, the umbrella 
NGO Pro Mujer International, and the unregulated Non-Bank Financial Institution Sartawi. 
Cochabamba, Bolivia MFIs included in my study: Pro Mujer Bolivia, Sartawi, and the NGO 
AgroCapital. Puno, Peru MFIs included in my study: Pro Mujer Peru, the regulated Non-Bank 
Financial Institution CRAC Los Andes, and the NGO Prisma. Cusco, Peru MFIs included in 
my study: the NGO Associacion Arariwa.
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work places of clients. In addition to spending between one and five 
days at each single organization while I conducted interviews and 
field visits, I gathered information about microfinance issues and 
the specific MFIs in my study from MFI literature and external 
sources. !ese supplementary sources helped me integrate quanti-
tative data into my analysis and confirm MFI claims regarding their 
financial and social development-related performance.
RESEARCH FINDINGS: KEY TRENDS IN PERUVIAN AND 
BOLIVIAN MICROFINANCE 
!e field research revealed a wide range of organizational reg-
ulatory frameworks, missions, target populations, types of services 
offered, and methodologies. Credit and savings deposits were still 
the primary products associated with microfinance. To administer 
such services, NGOs tended to use a system of group banking, al-
though some of them had also expanded into individual loan offer-
ings that clients could access once they had completed several group 
loan cycles (e.g., Pro Mujer Bolivia and Pro Mujer Peru). In terms 
of practices around integrating financial and non-financial services, 
I found that MFIs that are also NGOs tended to lean more toward 
some model of service integration. !e majority of the NGOs in 
my study offered their clients some form of training or education, 
while only a small number of regulated entities offered education. 
Some MFIs I encountered focused primarily on business training 
to help clients improve in areas like business planning, marketing, 
and revenues; others taught clients specific trades; a third subset 
stressed broader life topics such as family life, hygiene, nutrition, 
and maternal and child health. 
 To deliver the training, the MFI loan officers taught short, 
structured modules to clients at the beginning of loan repayment 
meetings. While directors and managers of an MFI claimed that 
training modules were delivered to loan groups at every meeting, 
I observed that such sessions occurred unpredictably. MFIs often 
lack the resources to follow up with every loan officer to ensure 
that the education was being offered. Moreover, some NGO cli-
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ents expressed dissatisfaction with long group meetings, inducing 
the loan officer to shorten the meeting by eliminating the training. 
However, my experience indicates that group meetings were often 
delayed not by long educational modules but by participants who 
were late due to making payments. In speaking informally with 
clients, I learned that many enjoyed the group meetings because 
they were a rare opportunity to participate in an activity for their 
own personal enrichment. "ese outings fulfill a social function as 
well: many knew the other women in their solidarity groups, which 
worked to fashion miniature social networks. 
"e poor healthcare statistics in Latin America* would sug-
gest that a number of MFIs might offer a healthcare component. 
However, I found that most MFIs did not emphasize the need to 
combine credit and healthcare, and only one organization in my 
study, Pro Mujer, offered direct healthcare to clients. "e financial 
and educational components are essentially the same in Pro Mujer 
Peru (PMP) and Pro Mujer Bolivia (PMB), but the way in which 
the two organizations deliver health services does vary. PMB uses 
the unified approach to integration, running its own medical clinics 
from which it offers clients primary healthcare as well as maternal 
and childcare. "ese clinics are located in the same centers where 
clients repay their individual or group loans and receive training 
sessions. Clients and their immediate families are able to use the 
health clinic whenever they need, and, to cover the cost, Pro Mujer 
charges a mandatory payment of sixty cents per month (which is 
added to the loan quota). PMP, on the other hand, practices the 
parallel approach to service integration, which focuses on estab-
lishing partner linkages for all health services rather than offering 
in-house services. "ese differences are partially explained by the 
fact that Peru’s public sector and health institutions are generally 
stronger than those in Bolivia, so PMP can trust outside providers 
to care for their clients whereas PMB must generally provide the 
services themselves. 
* "e World Health Organization calculates life expectancy at birth in Peru at sixty-one years, 




My findings demonstrate a broad range of practices among 
Peruvian and Bolivian MFIs. While this paper does not endorse 
specific MFI methods over others, it concludes that the integrated 
approach—using either education or health services in addition to 
a range of financial services—makes it more likely that an MFI will 
achieve the sought-after balance between solvency and social ser-
vices. Velasco, co-founder and director of PMB, emphasized how 
important it is for MFIs to focus on financial stability: “We have to 
see ourselves as efficient, as responsible, and as using the resources 
we have in the best way possible to have the largest margin possible 
to reinvest in our clients.”15 "us, in order to prove their feasibil-
ity, integrated MFIs need to have theoretical standards of efficiency 
that minimally match those of commercial entities.
Some practitioners of microfinance, however, have entered 
the sector motivated by profits rather than social development aims. 
According to a Finrural interviewee,  “commoditized” microfinance 
is when you have a commercial emphasis and you focus on selling 
your product. "is approach, however, can lead to a narrow focus 
on profit maximization and even promote system abuses because 
of microfinance’s potential to be both high profit and low-risk.16 If 
microfinance is to succeed in its goal of lifting people out of poverty, 
it must be an integrated, collaborative approach, involving the pub-
lic and private sectors.* If its focus is entirely on the business end, 
there exists a higher risk of clients failing to receive substantive as-
sistance. Practitioners on both ends of the microfinance spectrum 
must take into account the potential long-term retention benefits 
of providing comprehensive services for their clients.
My interviews revealed that the majority of Peruvian and 
Bolivian microfinance practitioners believe that it is possible to 
achieve the balance between an organization’s financial well-being 
* "e example of Pro Mujer’s healthcare delivery through establishing alliances shows the 
importance of working with the private and public sectors.
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and its social impact, and there is only a small minority of people 
in my study who believe that there is an inherent tradeoff between 
the two. Naldi Delgado, the director of PMP, says, “I do not believe 
there is a conflict. If an entity is efficient, it is going to have self-
sustainability. #e more efficient and financially sustainable it is, 
it is going to continue carrying out its activities so it will have an 
impact. I believe this is important for an entity to first be sustain-
able because if not, you don’t guarantee your permanence.”17  Na-
dia Alcazar, an employee of the Bolivian MFI funding organization 
Fundapro, echoed this view: 
I think that every entity has a cycle between sustainability and a 
great social impact. Initially you have to get sustainable, and you 
can’t search for both things at the same time—not when you 
are starting or when you’re at the stage of growth. If there ever 
comes a time where you are sustainable, you have an obligation 
to think about how to contribute to the people. So I think it is a 
process because you can’t demand the entity to take responsibil-
ity initially, because it won’t have anything to give. But over time, 
social impact has to become a part of an entity’s work.18




Secondary data confirms the cost-effectiveness of the service 
integration approach. One metric is an organization’s financial sus-
tainability. Data from the Consortium of Private Organizations for 
the Promotion of Small and Micro-Enterprise (COPEME), a mi-
crofinance umbrella organization, shows that every Peruvian inte-
grated organization studied had reached financial and operational 
sustainability.* In addition, nearly all of the Bolivian MFIs studied 
are financially sustainable, with a small minority of exceptions due 
* Where financial sustainability is defined as total revenues greater than total expenses and 
operational sustainability institutions as the ability to cover administrative costs with client 
revenues.
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to the recent financial crisis.19 Another indicator of financial vi-
ability are the ratings issued by MicroRate, a microfinance ratings 
agency that rates MFIs based on financial performance. MicroRate 
reports on the institutions in the study reveal that NGOs doing 
service integration have received financial performance ratings as 
high or higher than their regulated, non-integrated counterparts. A 
December 2009 report from COPEME compiling financial analy-
sis of a multitude of Peruvian MFIs shows that out of the fifteen 
Peruvian MFIs that are unregulated MFIs, thirteen were financial-
ly sustainable (defined as a positive net income after operating and 
finance expenses are considered). !us, 85 percent of the unregu-
lated MFIs were financially sustainable, and because unregulated 
institutions tend to provide integrated services, this strongly sug-
gests that integration can be financially savvy.20 
One cause of this fiscal strength is that the field agent must 
now provide both financial and educational services. !is is cost-
effective because the MFI does not have to train additional staff 
and can leverage already existing space and resources. While it is 
reasonable to expect a qualified staff member to be able to man-
age both the financial and educational components of the group, 
organizations should be aware of individual employee limitations. 
To provide effective education, the loan officer should be well 
trained in the specific modules as well as in broader educational 
techniques. FFH claims that the training for the facilitation skills 
of credit and non-credit learning sessions can be done at minimal 
extra cost.21  Even if there were increased marginal costs from the 
training, practitioners claim that the cost must be weighed against 
the benefits gained from having staff capable of delivering educa-
tion and financial transactions in the same session. 
As a pioneer of the integrated education and health model, 
Pro Mujer has had to defend itself from those who question the 
decision not to focus solely on financial efficiency. To answer these 
doubts, Pro Mujer conducted a cost allocation study of the inte-
gration models in their three largest organizations, Pro Mujer Ni-
caragua (PMN), Pro Mujer Bolivia (PMB), and Pro Mujer Peru 
(PMP).22 !e study revealed that the marginal cost of providing 
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health services was relatively low because overhead costs were dis-
persed throughout the organization. !is low marginal cost of non-
financial services suggests that integration can be cost-effective. 
Moreover, cost allocation showed that the Pro Mujer MFIs have 
a significant amount of incoming donations specifically for health 
services, and thus the non-financial component of the entity was 
more sustainable than initially realized. !e cross-subsidization 
practices mean that funds are generated reliably from the built-in 
profit engine of interest rates and fees. 
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Integrated services may improve the competitiveness of an 
MFI through differentiation from competitors. My interview with 
Luis Calvo, a manager of Pro Mujer Bolivia, confirmed this idea of 
improving competitiveness:
I believe that the social mission of Pro Mujer is what gives our 
organization a competitive factor. Why? Because many of the 
rest of the microfinance institutions do not offer you health ser-
vices, or they do not offer you training services. So the goal for 
Pro Mujer, in addition to offering high quality financial services, 
is that the non-financial services will be of such good quality 
that this is our differentiating competitive factor.23
In addition, socially motivated donors (who may value the holistic 
approach to clients’ development over a simply financial focus) also 
seem more attracted to the integrated model.24 !ese increased ex-
ternal donations are also helpful in covering the costs of education 
or health coverage. !is competitive advantage is especially sig-
nificant for MFIs in today’s crowded microfinance markets, where 
clients must choose between a plethora of organizations offering 
savings and credit. !e push for a ‘competitive advantage’ should 
be beneficial to the industry, as it will encourage innovation within 




!e third major benefit observed was increased loyalty and 
retention of clients. In the experience of those microfinance prac-
titioners in this study, offering clients an extra service such as edu-
cation on a variety of life topics creates a more intimate relation-
ship between clients and the MFI. !e idea that clients become 
more emotionally tied to such organizations is in agreement with 
findings from Karlan’s study on Finca-Peru.25 In an interview dis-
cussing BancoSol, Patricia Rojas, a products and services analyst 
at BancoSol’s central branch in La Paz, expressed her belief that 
the training component of the bank would improve the fidelity of 
clients: “If you are a client and you have your financial entity that 
gives you increased opportunities, you’re going to feel more trust-
ing and will not be as likely to leave the bank.” Various employees 
of Pro Mujer corroborated such claims, reporting that they have 
received positive feedback from clients who received the additional 
services. !ese programs are generally low-cost and contribute to 
the perception that an MFI is addressing the needs of its clientele 




Several of the organizations in my study offered health edu-
cation to clients (e.g., Pro Mujer, Finca-Peru, and Arariwa), and 
Pro Mujer was the only MFI to directly connect clients to health-
care. Pro Mujer has performed thousands of Pap smears on women 
and has given thousands of children vaccinations, thus playing a 
role in improving maternal and child health in Latin America. My 
interviews strongly suggest that health training and direct health 
interventions improve client health. Many Peruvian and Bolivian 
women struggle to access public health clinics and often do not 
trust the medical staff. When an organization like Pro Mujer com-
bines the health clinic with the same location providing microfi-
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nance services, there is a greater likelihood that women will seek 
preventative care for themselves and their families. 
My research indicates that health education and direct deliv-
ery of health services are not only beneficial for clients, but also for 
the organization delivering them. According to Carmen Velasco, 
“Even if you don’t care about the social component of the program 
of what you do, if you’re clever, you don’t want to kill your clients. 
You want them to be prosperous, and if it’s not for social reasons, 
it’s for financial reasons.” !is quote effectively sums up the logic of 
why focusing on the health and well-being of clients can be moti-
vated by social and financial factors. 
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My study did not attempt to gather quantitative evidence of 
the positive social effects of providing education to microfinance 
clients, but my field experiences and outside literature do suggest 
that integrating education into microfinance creates positive ex-
ternalities. In an interview with Jose Ramon, a financial officer at 
Finca-Peru, he explained the process of how many clients undergo 
changes in their personal attitude, knowledge, and life circumstanc-
es throughout their participation in the integrated credit and edu-
cation program: 
Generally, when people arrive at our organization, they come 
with a lot of uncertainty about their future ... So what Finca 
does is in the first months that a client is with them—they teach 
them to value themselves, especially women because they have to 
work so hard, and to have a lot of dedication in their work, and 
to be persistent. With this training, we see that in the beginning, 
the women have small businesses, and then they grow with their 
loans, purchasing capital, and little by little, they grow ... And 
this begins to change the vicious cycle, helping the women be 
more persistent, have a goal, and improve their lives and their 
families.30
While anecdotal, this idea is supported by a recent study at 
a Peruvian MFI not included in my study. In 2007, a randomized 
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control trial was conducted with the clients of PRISMA, a micro-
credit organization in Pucallpa, Peru. Half of the loan groups in the 
study were randomized to receive a health education intervention, 
in addition to the existing microcredit services. !e remaining loan 
groups continued to receive only microcredit services. !e results 
demonstrate that clients had improved health knowledge on issues 
related to child health after receiving a health education interven-
tion in their monthly loan groups.27 Whether education programs 
focus on entrepreneurship, family, self-esteem, or health, many of 
the practitioners I studied agreed that an education component to 
microfinance simply makes sense because the target population of 
MFIs is widely undereducated and often illiterate. 
)GSRSQMG-QTVSZIQIRX
!e final social benefit of integrated microfinance is the 
added economic progress for the clients. !is element can be par-
ticularly difficult to measure, given the need to distinguish between 
economic improvements through solely financial means and the 
externalities of the social component of the mixed model. A piece 
of evidence that demonstrates the economic progress of clients in 
integrated MFIs is the fact that clients in solidarity loan groups are 
graduating out of their small group loan products, demonstrating 
that they are financially prepared to access a larger individual loan 
for their business.28 In rare cases, clients have succeeded in formal-
izing their informal businesses, requiring them to move beyond the 
NGO and work with banks.29 
UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES DOES MICROFINANCE 
INTEGRATION WORK? 
Integrated microfinance will not work effectively in every con-
text. In implementing integrated microfinance, it is important that 
an MFI price the service appropriately and cover these costs with 
adequate interest rates. Integrated microfinance can work well in 
countries that have consumer protections in the form of interest 
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rate caps, but that have the flexibility to allow the rates required by 
integrated programs. Integration may not be possible in countries 
with rigid interest rate regulations, such as Venezuela, where strict 
caps decrease the likelihood that higher interest rates could be lev-
ied to subsidize the cost of social services. 
!e case of Pro Mujer also suggests that integrated micro-
finance can work effectively where a country’s public services are 
weak, allowing an MFI to address a widespread need in the popu-
lation through the unified approach. Similarly, a country with rel-
atively effective social service provisions should allow an MFI to 
forge partnerships with other service providers. 
CONCLUSION 
 Microfinance began as a tool for economic development, 
and many in the field still view poverty alleviation as its primary 
goal. With increased competition among MFIs and a greater em-
phasis on profits and shareholder returns, however, many MFIs are 
potentially losing sight of the sector’s original mission of alleviating 
poverty. !is paper argues that one of the most effective ways for 
MFIs to maintain this original social mission while also remaining 
financially sustainable is through a deliberate mix of financial and 
non-financial services. Critics of the integration approach argue 
that other institutions exist for the purpose of delivering social ser-
vices to underserved populations. What I wish to stress, however, 
is the existence of tools within integrated microfinance institutions 
that can be leveraged in ways unavailable to those focused solely on 
financial products. According to Velasco,  
It is extremely expensive to cover the overall costs of non-finan-
cial programs. But if you piggy-back on the overall costs that 
you have to incur no matter what if you are a financial institu-
tion, (you have to have a general director, a CFO, etc.), you can 
take advantage of this installed capacity, paying only your direct 
costs. So it’s a perfect marriage, and it assures that your health 
and training intervention stays on board together with a sustain-




Institution Type of MFI Organization Person/s Interviewed 
Lima, Peru MFI NGO Finca-Peru Director and Financial Manager. 
Lima, Peru MFI NGO ADRA- Peru Manager of Microfinance Portfolio 
Lima, Peru MFI NGO Prisma  Director and Head of Social Development 
Lima, Peru MFI EDPYME Credivisión  CEO 
La Paz, Bolivia MFI NGO Pro Mujer Bolivia 
Director of Marketing Unit, Manager of 
Marketing, Manager of Research and 
Development, Market Research Coordinator, 
Product Development Coordinator, Directors 
of Health Services, Loan Officer, and a client 
La Paz, Bolivia MFI NGO 
Pro Mujer 
International 
Coordinator of Financial Services, Director of 
Human Resources, and Founder/Director 
La Paz, Bolivia MFI Bank BancoSol Manager of Product Development 
La Paz, Bolivia MFI Bank Fie Manager 
La Paz, Bolivia MFI NBFI Fundación Sartawi Director 
Cochabamba, 
Bolivia MFI NGO Pro Mujer Bolivia Regional Director 
Cochabamba, 
Bolivia MFI NGO AgroCapital  Manager and Loan Officers 
Cochabamba, 
Bolivia MFI NBFI Fundación Sartawi Regional Director and Loan Officers 
Puno, Peru MFI NGO Pro Mujer Peru Director 
Puno, Peru MFI NGO Prisma Branch Director 
Puno, Peru MFI NBFI CRAC Los Andes 
Director, Business Manager, and Manager of 
Risk Unit 
Cusco, Peru MFI NGO Associación Arariwa Director 
La Paz, Bolivia MFI NGO CRECER Client 
Lima, Peru Rating Agency n/a MicroRate General Manager/Senior Analyst 
La Paz, Bolivia MFI Funder n/a Fundapro Consultant 
La Paz, Bolivia 
MFI Umbrella 
Network n/a Finrural Director 
Lima, Peru 
MFI Umbrella 
Network n/a COPEME Qualification and Supervision Specialist 
Lima, Peru Research Institution n/a 
Instituto Educación 
Peruanas Senior Researcher  
Cusco, Peru Research Institution n/a 
Innovations for 
Poverty Action Researcher 
La Paz, Bolivia University n/a 
Universidad Católica 
Boliviana Professor 




List of Microfinance Institutions Included in Field Research
 In defending the integrated approach, this paper contrib-
utes to the literature on microfinance and suggests a possible direc-
tion in which the field may indeed be evolving. It does not suggest 
that all MFIs should seek to emulate the integrated model, nor that 
MFIs operating more traditionally are not valuable. Nevertheless, 
the international microfinance movement should consider alter-
nate approaches towards microfinance as a possible tool that can 
accelerate the process of improving lives.
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